Preserving privacy against external and internal threats in WSN data aggregation by unknown
Telecommun Syst (2013) 52:2163–2176
DOI 10.1007/s11235-011-9539-8
Preserving privacy against external and internal threats in WSN
data aggregation
Lei Zhang · Honggang Zhang · Mauro Conti ·
Roberto Di Pietro · Sushil Jajodia ·
Luigi Vincenzo Mancini
Published online: 2 August 2011
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this paper, we propose two efficient and
privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols for WSNs:
PASKOS (Privacy preserving based on Anonymously
Shared Keys and Omniscient Sink) and PASKIS (Privacy
preserving based on Anonymously Shared Keys and Igno-
rant Sink)—requiring low overhead. Both protocols guaran-
tee privacy preservation and a high data-loss resilience. In
particular, PASKOS effectively protects the privacy of any
node against other nodes, by requiring O(logN) commu-
nication cost in the worst case and O(1) on average, and
O(1) as for memory and computation. PASKIS can even
protect a node’s privacy against a compromised sink, requir-
ing only O(1) overhead as for computation, communication,
and memory; however, these gains in efficiency are traded-
off with a (slightly) decrease in the assured level of privacy.
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A thorough analysis and extensive simulations demon-
strate the superior performance of our protocols against ex-
isting solutions in terms of privacy-preserving effectiveness,
efficiency, and accuracy of computed aggregation.
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1 Introduction
Applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) range
from military surveillance to environmental monitoring.
WSNs applications, such as domotics and health care [1, 2],
have recently also been envisioned to help our daily lives.
An important issue with the latter applications is the pri-
vacy of collected information. For instance, people might
not want to disclose their personal information when WSNs
are used to measure power or water usage of their houses
(this information can be useful to the provider of the com-
modity [1] for optimizing the distribution of resource). The
privacy issue is even more compelling and evident in health
care applications [2]. Privacy is also important in surveil-
lance applications; for instance, data need to be protected in
a WSN collecting personally identifiable information such
as sensing the identities of people in a building as part of an
access control system [3].
In this paper, we address the challenge of designing ef-
ficient privacy-preserving protocols for data aggregation in
wireless sensor networks. Intuitively, the data aggregation
should be executed in a way that, besides the aggregation
result, no information from a single node can be revealed to
any other entities.
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In a typical WSN, a number of sensor nodes are deployed
in an area of interest and they self-organize to form a net-
work. The values sensed by sensor nodes are collected by a
sink or base station (which is computationally more power-
ful and secure than sensor nodes) for further processing. For
typical applications where the sink is only interested in some
kind of aggregate value such as the average of all sensed val-
ues, the aggregate value is collected via an in-network data
aggregation process (for reducing energy consumption) in
which partial aggregate values are combined at intermediate
nodes en route to the sink. This process is realized by con-
structing a spanning tree among sensor nodes with the sink
directly connected to the root sensor node, and each sensor
node aggregates its incoming data with its sensed value (pri-
vately owned), and then sends the result to its parent node in
the tree [4, 5].
Note that for the data aggregation process in its basic
form, the private sensed value of a sensor node can be easily
inferred by a curious neighbor node (within wireless com-
munication range) or an eavesdropper. In this paper, to pro-
tect the privacy of a sensor’s sensed value we strive to design
a protocol for the aggregation process with the following
security and operating requirements: (i) privacy-preserving.
The protocol can protect the private sensed value of a node
from being disclosed to any other sensor node, the sink, an
adversary that compromises a portion of the network nodes,
or even an adversary that compromises the sink and can
eavesdrop all network traffic; (ii) the protocol is data-loss
resilient [6] in the sense that it will always compute an in-
tended aggregation function (e.g., average) over the actual
contributing data values, despite of any message loss or node
failure; (iii) the protocol is efficient in terms of computa-
tion and communication so to reduce energy consumption
and increasing the life time of a WSN. To the best of our
knowledge, the existing privacy-preserving data aggregation
algorithms in [1, 6–8] do not completely satisfy these re-
quirements. We should notify that among the above privacy-
preserving requirements, to protect the single node’s privacy
against the sink is also important. For example, in a health
care application [2] where drug supplement is investigated,
privacy is of high value. Furthermore, the privacy-preserving
algorithms for data mining applications [9, 10] are compu-
tationally too expensive for the resource constrained sensor
nodes.
To meet the above requirements, we propose two proto-
cols: PASKOS (Privacy-preserving based on Anonymously
Shared Keys and Omniscient Sink) and PASKIS (Privacy-
preserving based on Anonymously Shared Keys and Igno-
rant Sink). In both protocols, each sensor node is set up
to anonymously share a number of secret keys with other
nodes or the sink. In PASKOS, the sink is omniscient, i.e.,
it possesses every secret key shared by the sensor nodes;
in PASKIS, the sink is oblivious, i.e., it does not know any
of the shared keys. In both protocols, each node will com-
pute a secret keyed value using the shared secret keys and
submit the sum of its sensed value and the keyed value to
the aggregation process. In PASKOS, the sink will retrieve
the true aggregate of sensed value by removing the keyed
values himself. In PASKIS, the sink will directly obtain the
true aggregate result because the keyed values are removed
by nodes themselves during the aggregation process. The
effective privacy-preservation of each node’s sensed value
is due to the small probability for any two nodes to share a
relatively large number of keys.
Our protocols are inspired by the technique in [6], in
which during the aggregation phase, each node submits to
the aggregation process the sum of its sensed value and a
secret value shared between this node and the sink, and the
sink can recover the final aggregate of sensed values by re-
moving all the secret values from its received data. The tech-
nique in [6] ensures that the privacy of each node’s sensed
value is protected by the secret values, but it does not pro-
vide privacy protection of a node against the sink that can
eavesdrop the node’s incoming and outgoing traffic, and that
the technique in [6] is not data-loss resilient, i.e., a single
message loss will cause the sink cannot correctly remove
all keyed values. Compared to [6], both our protocols are
data-loss resilient, and PASKIS can even protect a node’s
privacy from the sink. In addition, note that both our proto-
cols’ key assignment process pre-assign to each sensor node
a set of keys randomly chosen from a large key pool, sim-
ilarly to [11]. However, the scheme in [11]—superseded in
[12]—attempts to ensure each pair of neighbor nodes share
keys and more shared keys implies a better secure commu-
nication service. Whereas, our protocols take advantage of
the pre-assigned keys in a different way: any two neighbor
nodes are very unlikely (with very low probability) to be as-
signed with the same set of keys.
Our contributions.
– We propose the PASKOS protocol that can protect the
privacy of a node from other sensor nodes, and it also
achieves a high privacy-preserving assurance when a por-
tion of network nodes is compromised (but not the sink)
by an adversary who can eavesdrop all network traffic.
The computation and memory overheads in each node are
O(1) in the worst case; the communication overhead in
each node is O(1) on average, and O(logN) in the worst
case.
– We propose the PASKIS protocol that can protect the pri-
vacy of a sensor node even when the sink and a portion of
network nodes are compromised at the same time, besides
the privacy-protection provided by PASKOS. The com-
putation, memory and communication overheads in each
node are all O(1) in the worst case. Compared with the
PASKOS protocol, the higher efficiency of the PASKIS
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protocol comes with a slightly higher probability of pri-
vacy violation when a portion of sensor nodes (but not the
sink) are compromised by an adversary.
– Through formal analysis and simulations, we demon-
strate our protocols’ privacy-preserving effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, and data-loss resilience.
We finally remark that the aim of our work is to guar-
antee the privacy of the nodes participating in the aggre-
gation mechanism. The security of the aggregation mech-
anism itself is out of the scope of the paper. In particular, the
proposed solution is vulnerable to Denial of Service attack.
However, other solutions exist in the literature to cope with
this issue. For instance, other works address the problem of
checking if the collected aggregate has been compromised
[13–17] or even identify the malicious node [17]. Note that,
this problem is also closely related to the problem of “Out-
lier Detection” [18].
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2 we present the related work. Section 3 presents the
assumption and the notation used throughout the paper. In
Sect. 4 we propose our PASKOS protocol, while Sect. 5
details the PASKIS protocol. The analysis and simulation-
based evaluation of the proposals can be found in Sect. 6.
Concluding remarks are reported in Sect. 7.
2 Related work
The need for saving energy in WSNs has urged researchers
to introduce the in-network aggregation paradigma. The first
proposals, such as [4, 5], were designed to compute ag-
gregates such as Count, Sum, and Average. However, secu-
rity and privacy issues were simply ignored. As for security,
a few interesting proposals have been enriching the litera-
ture corpus, such as [13, 15, 16, 19, 20]; however, none of
the above algorithms was designed to address privacy issues.
It is interesting to note that privacy issues in comput-
ing aggregate has already been addressed in both statisti-
cal database and data mining applications. For instance, in
[9, 10], the authors proposed data perturbation techniques
to protect values privacy, whereas a few secure multi-party
computation schemes were designed in [21–23]. However,
these solutions require data to be centralized in order to
process them. Further, these privacy-preserving algorithms
generate a heavy computing load; something that does not
fit the resource constrained capabilities in a WSN. Finally,
even if some recent proposals [24, 25] considerably reduces
the computational overhead, WSNs still require ad-hoc so-
lutions to fit their hardware constraints. An interesting pro-
posal appeared in [3] introduces the possibility to select
the appropriate privacy preserving policy, when querying a
WSN. There, different techniques supporting the described
goal are detailed. A recent privacy issue in WSNs relates to
the privacy of the ID of nodes that signal an event. Prob-
lem statement and preliminary results are provided in [26].
The same problem is addressed in [27], highlighting a tech-
nique focusing on preserving the anonymity of the sensor
ID that provides the data of interest, rather than on the pri-
vacy of the data itself. However, the protocol provided re-
lies on onion-routing like solution, hence introducing a non-
negligible burden on both computational and communica-
tion. Further, the level of privacy achieved still needs to be
fully validated.
The foundations of math that allow to perform computa-
tions over encrypted data are referred in computer science as
Privacy Homomorphism (PH). The first Privacy Homomor-
phism (PH) was proposed by Rivest et al. [28] to allow ag-
gregation of encrypted data. In Girao et al.’s work [7], a PH
construction is used to allow the aggregator node to fuse the
locally sensed data with the encrypted aggregate received
from contributing sensor nodes. However, the protocol does
not guarantee the privacy of individual sensed data either
against other nodes or against the sink.
In the following we report the state of the art as for pri-
vacy preserving data aggregation protocols; we will com-
pare our proposals against the most representative protocols,
as summarized in Table 1.
In [6], the authors propose a solution for data aggregation
that preserves the privacy against other nodes. The authors
assume that each node ni shares a key ki with the sink and
always adds a secret number as noise, determined by ki , to
its sensed value. The BS can remove, from the received ag-
gregate, all the noises because he shares the keys with all
nodes. We observe that this scheme does not protect privacy
of individual sensed values against the sink and, moreover,
is severely vulnerable to message loss, which is common in
a WSN. In particular, the sink will obtain a bogus aggregate
even with a single message loss. The authors propose to cope
with this last issue by adding either the list of contributing
nodes or the list of nodes that did not contribute (whichever
is shorter).
However, this solution does not prevent this list from be-
ing O(N) in length—in the worst case—, where N is the
number of sensors in the network. In [1], the authors pro-
pose two different solutions: CPDA and SMART. The for-
mer gives a solution for data aggregation preserving node-
privacy against other nodes. However, as the same authors
recognize, the overhead of this protocol is high. The latter
proposal, SMART, is more efficient than the first one. How-
ever, it suffers from the same problem of message-loss as
in [6]. Furthermore, in [29] the authors addressed the prob-
lem, by which the solution in [6] is affected, i.e., the sink has
to know the list of the nodes participating in the aggregation.
However, these solution come at the cost of an increase in
the computational complexity.
Another recent work addressing privacy is [8]; however
the solution proposed is not resilient against a compromised
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Table 1 Private Data Aggregation protocols: Comparing the security features and complexities. †: bounded by a pre-determined constant param-
eter K for the protocol. ‡: bounded by a pre-determined constant parameter P for the protocol
Aggregation Encryption Privacy Privacy Privacy Data-loss Node comput. Commun.
type type from from from resilience complexity complexity
eaves. other nodes the sink
CDA protocol [7] Hop-by-hop CH-to-BS Yes No No Yes O(1) O(1)
Protocol in [6] Hop-by-hop Node-to-BS Yes Yes No No O(1) O(1)
CPDA protocol [1] CH Node-to-CH Yes Yes Yes Yes O(C2 logC) O(C)
SMART protocol [1] Hop-by-hop Node-to-node Yes Yes Yes No O(1) O(C)
O-ASP [29] Hop-by-hop Node-to-BS Yes Yes No Yes O(1) O(C)
D-ASP [29] Hop-by-hop Node-to-BS Yes Yes No Yes O(1) O(C)
Mlaih et al. [8] Hop-by-hop Node-to-BS Yes Yes No No O(1) O(1)
PASKOS—Sect. 4 Hop-by-hop Node-to-node Yes Yes No Yes O(1)† O(logN)‡
PASKIS—Sect. 5 Hop-by-hop Node-to-node Yes Yes Yes Yes O(1)† O(1)‡
sink. Further, tight message synchronization constraints are
placed on both the sink and the nodes in the network. In-
deed, if an aggregated message sent by a node to the sink
does not reach the sink, any further aggregation phase will
fail. Similar message synchronization problems have been
pointed out also when dealing with privacy for RFID sys-
tems [30].
We recently proposed PASKOS and PASKIS [31].
PASKOS effectively protects the privacy of any node against
other nodes, by requiring O(logN) communication cost in
the worst case and O(1) on average, and requiring O(1)
memory and computation cost. PASKIS can even protect a
node’s privacy against a compromised sink, and it is more
efficient, requiring only O(1) overhead as for computation,
communication, and memory; however, these gains in ef-
ficiency are traded-off with a (slightly) decreased level of
privacy. The present work is an extension of [31]. In the cur-
rent version of the paper, we give a more detailed description
and performances investigation of the protocols proposed in
[31].
In Table 1 we summarize the comparisons of our proto-
cols with other existing privacy-preserving protocols/algo-
rithms. Hop-by-hop aggregation type means that each node
adds its own value to the aggregate; CH aggregation type
means that a local aggregation is performed by the cluster
head (one selected node in the cluster). The Encryption type
column refers to the nodes that are involved in an encryption
and decryption process. In particular, Node-to-BS means that
each node encrypts some data that cannot be decrypted until
it reaches the BS. In the Privacy from other nodes column
we assume some nodes are compromised by an adversary
that can also eavesdrop all network traffic. In Privacy from
the sink column we assume the sink and a portion of sensor
nodes are compromised by an adversary that can also eaves-
drop all network traffic. The column Data-loss resilience
refers to the fact that the base station can compute the cor-
rect aggregate if a number of nodes do not participate in the
protocol or if a message is lost. Finally, C and N represent
the size of a cluster (as a privacy protection parameter) and
the number of nodes respectively.
Note that except CPDA in [1], the other existing privacy-
preserving protocols (including CDA [7], the protocol in
[6], SMART [1], O-ASP and D-ASP [29], the protocol
in [8]) cannot simultaneously provide data-loss resilience
and satisfy all the privacy-preserving requirements men-
tioned above—with the exception of CPDA. However, when
CPDA is compared to our proposal, it turns out that it is op-
erationally much more complicated and has higher compu-
tational and communication complexity.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Network model
We consider a wireless sensor network in which a sink or
base station collects aggregated information of the sensed
values of all nodes in the network. Typical aggregated infor-
mation includes sum, average, min, max, and count. In this
paper, we focus on the sum of sensed values of all sensor
nodes. Finding many other aggregated information such as
average, count can be reduced to finding sum [1, 6].
A typical data aggregation process [4] works as fol-
lows. Initially in phase 1 (request broadcast phase), the
sink broadcasts an aggregation request. Each node sets as
its parent the node from which it hears the request and re-
broadcasts the request. A logical aggregation tree is built in
the network in this phase. In phase 2 (aggregation phase),
the leaf nodes of the logical tree will send their sensed val-
ues to their parent nodes. Each non-leaf node aggregates all
received values (from its children) with its own sensed value,
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and then sends its aggregate to its parent node. In the end,
the sink receives the aggregate of the sensed value of all
nodes that have participated in the aggregation process. Note
that each node only needs to communicate with its neighbor
nodes in the aggregation tree.
3.2 Criteria for efficient privacy-preserving data
aggregation protocol
Effectiveness of privacy-preserving First, we require that
the private sensed value of any node should not be disclosed
to any other node in the network or even the sink. Second,
in the case that a powerful adversary is able to eavesdrop all
network traffic and compromise a portion of nodes or even
the sink, a good protocol should be able to reduce as much
as possible the probability that the private sensed value of an
un-compromised node is disclosed to the adversary.
Efficiency Recall that in-network processing schemes in a
WSN are developed to reduce the power and bandwidth us-
age for resource constrained WSNs. Thus, a good protocol
should not impose a large amount of overhead on communi-
cation, computation, and memory, for the sake of achieving
any privacy-preserving goal.
Data loss resilience In WSNs, message loss essentially
drops some nodes from an aggregation. Thus after removing
all privacy-preserving related information, the sink should
be able to correctly retrieve the aggregate of the sensed val-
ues of only those nodes who actually have participated in
the aggregation. This property is referred to as data-loss re-
silience. For instance, the scheme in [6] is not data-loss re-
silient if the sink does not know the list of actual participat-
ing nodes.
3.3 Solution overview
Our goal is to design privacy-preserving data aggregation
protocols that achieve the aforementioned effectiveness, ef-
ficiency, and data loss resilience. To this end, we propose
two protocols: PASKOS and PASKIS. The key idea of our
protocols is outlined below.
We introduce keyed values into a typical data aggregation
protocol such as TAG [4]: each node computes a randomized
value by adding a secret keyed value to its sensed value and
submits only the randomized value during the data aggrega-
tion. The keyed value is computed (through a hash function)
from some secret keys held by the node. More specifically,
assuming each sensed value is an integer, the computations
for the randomized value and the data aggregation are done
using modular arithmetic, with the same modulus M . For
example, the randomized value is computed as follows:
randomized value ≡ sensed_value + keyed_value mod M
We select for M a value that is sufficiently large, i.e.,
M > N · sd , where N is the number of nodes in the network
and sd is the upper bound for the sensed value (assumed to
be non-negative). This is a necessary condition for the sink
to remove all keyed values from the aggregation result to
obtain the precise sum of the sensed value. Note that we as-
sume the keyed value is expressed on a number of bits that
is enough to protect the sensed value. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we will use “+” and “−” as modular addition and
subtraction in the remainder of this paper.
We recall that in [6] each node shares a secret key with
the sink and uses it to compute the keyed value. Thus, the
sink can compute all the keyed values by itself and remove
them from the aggregation result. Again, it is worth noting
that this solution: (i) is not data-loss resilient; (ii) cannot pro-
tect a node’s privacy against the sink, if the sink can eaves-
drop a node’s communication content.
Compared to [6], our protocols leverage the idea of
“anonymous sharing”. Specifically, each node, instead of
sharing a secret key with the sink, is pre-assigned with a
set of keys (i.e., a key ring) that are randomly chosen from a
secret key pool (similar to Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme
[11]). Each node knows the IDs of all the keys in the key
pool, and each node keeps its own key ring secret to it-
self. Thus each node shares its keys anonymously with other
nodes, and the probability that any pair of nodes share the
same key ring is very small. The lower this probability, the
higher the privacy provided by our protocols. In PASKOS,
we let the sink possess the whole key pool, whereas in
PASKIS, the sink does not possess any key.
These “anonymously” shared keys will be used to com-
pute the keyed values by each node. Note that in [11], the
pre-assigned keys are used to establish unique session keys
between any two nodes so that the selection of key pool
size and the key ring size should be dependent on network
size, wireless communication range, etc. However, the key-
assignment process for our protocols has completely differ-
ent purpose as mentioned above. For preserving the privacy
of each node, we utilize the fact that the probability for any
two nodes to share the same set of pre-assigned keys are
very low. Thus, we can select the key pool size P and the
key ring size K as pre-determined constant for the privacy
protection. Note that in PASKIS, we need to make sure any
key that is used in aggregation process should be at least
shared (anonymously of course) by a pair of nodes, which
can be guaranteed by the operation of our protocols.
Table 2 lists the notations used in our protocols.
4 The PASKOS protocol
In this section, we present the PASKOS protocol, which can
protect the privacy of a node against any other sensor nodes
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Table 2 Notations used in our protocols
N Number of nodes in the network
n0 . . . nN−1 Nodes’ IDs
P Key-pool size, number of different keys in total
Kj Key ring of node nj , containing assigned keys
K Key-ring size, number of keys assigned to each node
ki i-th key in the overall key pool
Seed Identification number of an aggregation process
BITjQ P -bit key bitmaps of node nj
(request broadcast phase of PASKIS protocol)
BITjA P -bit key bitmaps of node nj
(aggregation phase of PASKIS protocol)
bitji,Q, bit
j






dj Value of sensed value of node nj ,
assumed to be integers
Dj Aggregated value of node nj
Hash A secure hash function used by all nodes
+/− +/ − mod M , where M is chosen to be
larger than N · sd , and sd is the upper bound
(assumed to be non-negative) for sensed values
in a WSN. The basic idea of this protocol is that each node
uses all of its keys in its key ring to compute its keyed value,
and the sink is omniscient (i.e., possesses the whole key
pool).
Before describing the PASKOS protocol, we observe that
this differs from solutions where each node shares a different
symmetric key with the sink (such as in [6]) and each node
uses that key to make private its own aggregated value. In
particular, the differences are twofold:
– first, the current solution (i.e. [6]) does not have mecha-
nisms for data loss resiliency—if just one node is not able
to participate in the aggregation, the sink cannot retrieve
the correct aggregate.
– a fix to the previous problem can be made for [6] adding
to the forwarded aggregated value the information about
the ids of the nodes that actually participated in the ag-
gregation. However, this information would have a O(N)
message size overhead, rather than O(P ) of our proposal.
As P (the key pool size we consider) is independent from
N (the size of the network) this make our proposal based
on random keys assignment more scalable than just ex-
tending previous solutions.
4.1 Protocol description
In the request broadcast phase, the sink first sends its re-
quest to one node, denoted as n0. Then starting from n0,
the request is broadcast to the entire network in a hop-by-
hop fashion. As a result, an aggregation tree (rooted at n0) is
Procedure 1 PASKOS_Leaf_Aggregate
1: /*Node na executes this procedure*/
2: Da = da /*da is the sensed value of node na*/;
3: for each ki ∈ Ka do
4: cai = a randomly picked value from {1,−1};
5: Da = Da + cai · Hash(Seed, ki);
6: end for
7: Node na sends 〈Da,Ca〉 to its Parent(na);
Procedure 2 PASKOS_Non-Leaf_Aggregate
1: /* Node na executes this procedure */
2: for each nj in Children(na) do
3: Receive 〈Dj ,Cj 〉 from nj ;
4: end for
5: Da = ∑nj∈Children(na) Dj ;
6: Da = Da + da ;/*da is the sensed value of na*/
7: for each ki(1 ≤ i ≤ P) in the key pool do




9: if ki ∈ Ka then
















20: if na = n0 then
21: Send 〈Da,Ca〉 to its Parent(na);
22: else
23: Send 〈D0,C0〉 to the Sink;
24: end if
formed. In the aggregation phase, typically the sensed values
of all sensor nodes get aggregated as they propagate from
leaf nodes up to the root node n0. With the PASKOS proto-
col, nodes perform the following operations.
A leaf node na follows the sequence of steps shown in
Procedure 1. It first computes a keyed value, Hash(Seed, ki),
for each key ki that it possesses. Note that Seed is the iden-
tification number of an aggregation process. Then, this node
randomly chooses to add all keyed values to or subtracts
them from this node’s sensed value. This step is shown in
line 5, where cai (that takes on either the value 1 or −1)
indicates the random choice (adding or subtracting, respec-
tively). The resulting randomized value is denoted by Da .
We use Ca to denote the set or the vector of all coefficients
used by node na .
Each non-leaf node na follows the algorithm described in
Procedure 2. First, na aggregates the values received from its
children with its own sensed value da (line 5 and line 6) to
get Da . Then, na computes a keyed value based on each pos-
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sessed key ki . Further, na adds or subtracts these keyed val-
ues from Da in the following way. For each key ki possessed
by na (i.e., ki ∈ Ka), if the sum of coefficients used by the
children of na is either 1 or −1 (line 10), then na sets cai ei-
ther to −1 or 1, respectively (line 11). Otherwise, na sets cai
to a randomly chosen value from set {1,−1} (line 13). For
each key ki /∈ Ka but used by its descendants, node na will
simply set cai to its received sum of coefficients. Note that
lines 10 and 11 guarantee that any key ki possessed by na is
used in computing its Da . Without these two lines, it would
be possible that ki is not used by na . For example, this could
occur if temp = 1 and the cai is set to 1 (with probability 0.5
based on line 13).
The sink—that holds the entire key pool—retrieves the
sum of all sensed values D (D = ∑Nj=1 dj ) from its received
final aggregated randomized value D0 as follows:
D = D0 −
P∑
i=1
c0i · Hash(Seed, ki) (1)
4.2 An example
We now show how the PASKOS protocol works through
an example with 6 sensor nodes as shown in Fig. 1. Sup-
pose that the key pool size is 4. In the request broadcast
phase, an aggregation tree (rooted at n0) is formed in this
WSN. In the aggregation phase, leaf node n5 computes
its randomized value D5 (based on Procedure 1), and then
sends it together with C5 : (0,0,1,−1) (vector of coeffi-
cients (c1, c2, c3, c4)) to its parent node n2. Note that in
Fig. 1 we use Si to denote the keyed value computed from
key ki and Seed (unique to each round of data aggregation);
that is, Si = Hash(Seed, ki). Similarly leaf nodes n3 and n4
Fig. 1 An instance of the data aggregation process with the PASKOS
protocol and an example WSN consisting of 6 sensor nodes and a sink.
Keyed values: Si = Hash(Seed, ki ). Key pool contains 4 keys. Each
transferred message consists of an aggregated randomized value and a
set of coefficients
send their D3 and D4 along with their coefficients to their
parent node n1. Then, following the algorithm in Procedure
2, non-leaf nodes n1 and n2 send their aggregate results and
coefficients to their parent node n0. Root node n0 then sends
the final aggregate D0 along with its vector of coefficients to
the sink.
4.3 Analysis of PASKOS protocol
Privacy First, PASKOS protocol protects the privacy of
any sensor node against any other node in the network.
This is because, by choosing appropriate parameters K and
P , our random key pre-assignment process guarantees that
the probability of any two nodes sharing the same key
ring is negligible. For instance, in the example shown in
Fig. 1, node n1 cannot infer its child’s private sensed value
d3, based on its knowledge of k2, k3,D3 and C3. Second,
PASKOS protocol protects a node’s private sensed value
against the sink, since the sink does not know the key rings
of individual nodes, although the sink knows the entire key
pool. Third, PASKOS can keep a node’s privacy-disclosure
probability at a desired low level. This is possible even in
face of a powerful adversary that can compromise a portion
of the network nodes (but not the sink) to obtain their stored
information (such as key rings) and also can eavesdrop all
network traffic. A detailed analysis of PASKOS is provided
in Sect. 6.
However, if the adversary compromises the sink and is
able to eavesdrop all network traffic, then this protocol fails
to protect any node’s privacy.
Correctness The sink can always obtain the aggregate of
all sensed values by removing all keyed values from the re-
ceived aggregate result, because the sink knows the entire
key pool and root n0 sends the vector of coefficients for used
keys to the sink.
Efficiency In the PASKOS protocol, each node stores a
constant (K) number of pre-distributed keys and uses them
to compute keyed values via a hash function. The mem-
ory and computational overhead per node is bounded by
the constant K . Now consider the communication overhead
per node. In the worst case (also expected to be very rare)
during the aggregation phase, the largest number of times
that any pre-assigned key is used to compute the keyed val-
ues is bounded by N , stored in O(logN) bits. As the key
pool size P is also a pre-determined constant, the worst-case
communication overhead is bounded by O(logN). How-
ever, on average the communication overhead is O(1). This
is because the coefficients of the pre-assigned keys to com-
pute the keyed values are uniformly at random chosen from
{−1,1}.
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5 The PASKIS protocol
The PASKOS protocol proposed in the previous section
is privacy-preserving except for a strong adversary model
where the adversary can compromise the sink and eaves-
drop all network traffic. In order to deal with a compromised
sink and further reduce the communication overhead, in this
section we present the PASKIS protocol. This protocol dif-
fers from PASKOS in that each node selectively uses its pre-
assigned keys in computing keyed values, and the sink does
not possesses any key (being oblivious). Although PASKIS
protocol has advantages over PASKOS in the above men-
tioned two aspects, PASKIS provides a slightly decreased
privacy protection than PASKOS when a portion of sensor
nodes are compromised.
5.1 Protocol description
The key idea of this protocol is that a node ni aggregates
its sensed values with its keyed values that are computed
from only a subset of keys in its key ring. This subset is
determined by ni ’s key ring and a bitmap BIT iQ received
from ni ’s parent node along with the aggregation request.
Phase 1: Aggregation Request Broadcast
At the beginning, the sink connects to node n0 and sends
to n0 the aggregation request identified by Seed, a number
unique to each round of data aggregation. Note that n0 be-
comes the root of the aggregation tree. The aggregation re-
quest message is appended with a bitmap of the keys the sink
possesses, from which the keyed values contained in the re-
turned aggregate will be computed by n0. We assume that
the sink does not possess any key, therefore, this bitmap is a
P-bit 0-string. We denote it as BIT0, and n0 should enforce
that in the aggregated value it sends to the sink, there is no
keyed value computed from any key.
This process is summarized in Procedure 3.
Each node na , after receiving the broadcast request, in-
cluding a bitmap of keys, recorded as BITaQ, will relay the
aggregation request to each of its children, along with a new
bitmap of keys computed as follows. For each key ki in the
key pool: (1) if na possesses ki , then na sets the i-th bit of all
of its children’s bitmaps to 1. This guarantees that ki is al-
lowed to be used in the returned aggregated result (the sum
of randomized values) by na’s children; (2) if na does not
possess ki but bitai,Q = 1 in BITaQ (it is allowed to use ki by
its parent node), then na will allow only one randomly cho-
sen child to use ki in the aggregated result; (3) if na does not
Procedure 3 Sink_Request
1: BIT0 = (0)P ;
2: Sink → n0 : 〈Seed,BIT0〉;
possess ki and it is not allowed to use ki by its parent node,
all of na’s children will not be allowed to use ki .
This process is summarized in Procedure 4; where
Parent(a) and Children(a) denote the parent node and the
set of children of node na respectively.
Phase 2: In-network Data Aggregation.
In the aggregation phase, each leaf node na computes the
keyed values based on the random keys assigned to it and
that Parent(na) allowed to be used (i.e., specified by na in
the key bitmap BITaQ). Then, na will submit its randomized
value into the aggregation along with the bitmap of the ac-
tually used keys back to its parent node (denoted as BITaA) ,
as described in Procedure 5.
Procedure 4 Request_Relay
1: /*Node na executes this procedure*/
2: Node na receives 〈Seed,BITaQ〉 from its Parent(na)
3: if na is a leaf node then
4: return; //begin the aggregation procedure
5: end if
6: for each ki(1 ≤ i ≤ P) in the key pool do
7: if ki ∈ Ka then
8: for each nj ∈ Children(na) do
9: bitji,Q = 1;
10: end for
11: else
12: Random select nk from Children(na);
13: bitki,Q = bitai,Q;
14: for each nj ∈ Children(na) \ {nk} do




19: for each nj ∈ Children(na) do
20: na sends < Seed,BITjQ > to nj .
21: end for
Procedure 5 Leaf_Aggregate
1: /*Node na executes this procedure*/
2: Da = da ;
3: for each ki(1 ≤ i ≤ P) in the key pool do
4: if bitai,Q == 1 and ki ∈ Ka then
5: Da = Da + Hash(Seed, ki);
6: bitai,A = 1;
7: else
8: bitai,A = 0;
9: end if
10: end for
11: na sends 〈Da,BITaA〉 to Parent(na)
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Procedure 6 Non-Leaf_Aggregate
1: /*Node na executes this procedure*/
2: for each nj in Children(na) do
3: na receives 〈Dj,BITjA〉 from nj ;
4: end for
5: Da = ∑nj∈Children(na) Dj ;
6: Da = Da + da ;
7: for each ki(1 ≤ i ≤ P) in the key pool do
8: if ki ∈ Ka then
9: bitai,A = bitai,Q;













15: if na = n0 then
16: na sends 〈Da,BITaA〉 to Parent(na);
17: else
18: n0 sends 〈D0〉 to the sink;
19: end if
Each non-leaf node na first aggregates the values re-
ceived from its children, then adds to that result both its
own sensed value and its own keyed values. Its keyed val-
ues are computed in the following way. For each ki in the
key pool: (1) if na possesses ki , it will use ki to compute the
keyed value such that the total number of times ki is used
is equal to the value bitai,Q in na’s key bitmap BIT
a
Q; other-
wise, (2) na will not use ki to compute the keyed value. The
final aggregation result will be sent to na’s parent node.
This process is summarized in Procedure 6.
The last message in the aggregation process is sent by
n0 to the sink. As it will be shown in the analysis, the final
aggregate D0 will be exactly the sum of all nodes’ sensed
values if the original BIT0Q is a P-bit 0-string, that is D0 =∑
1≤j≤N dj .
5.2 An example
We now show how the PASKIS protocol works through the
same example we use for the discussion of the PASKOS pro-
tocol. The executing process is shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2(a)
shows how key bitmaps propagate along with the aggrega-
tion request. Figure 2(b) shows how data aggregation pro-
ceeds along with returned key bitmaps. Eventually, the node
n0 receives all intermediate aggregates that are protected by
the keyed values computed from k1, k4, all known to n0.
Therefore, the sink will be able to receive the sum of all
sensed value from n0.
Fig. 2 In (a), Bitmaps (BIT iQ) are computed and sent by each node
to its children in request broadcast phase. In (b) for aggregation phase,
each node aggregates its sensed value with keyed values, and then send
to its parent node the aggregated result along with the bitmap (BIT iA)
of keys actually used in computing keyed values
5.3 Analysis of PASKIS protocol
Privacy The PASKIS protocol can protect the privacy of
any node against any other sensor nodes in the same way as
the PASKOS protocol. Note that in PASKIS, the sink does
not possess any of the pre-distributed key. Therefore, it does
not help the adversary if it can compromise the sink in or-
der to obtain any node’s private value. This is certainly an
advantage over PASKOS protocol where the sink has the
whole key pool. On the other hand, in PASKIS, fewer keys
are used to compute the keyed values by each node than that
of the PASKOS protocol. Therefore, if the adversary can
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compromise a portion of nodes, then it can more likely learn
the private sensed value of a node with PASKIS than with
PASKOS. A detailed comparison of these two protocols is
given in Sect. 6.
Correctness PASKIS protocol guarantees that the sink will
always be able to receive exactly the aggregate of all sensed
values (i.e., received data contains no keyed values at all).
This is because: (1) any node introduces a new key into the
computation of keyed values only if one of its ancestors pos-
sesses the same key; (2) any node removes a key from being
used in the keyed values if none of its ancestors possesses
that key.
Efficiency Similar to the PASKOS protocol, the PASKIS
protocol also has a per-node memory and computation over-
head of O(1). But unlike PASKOS, the coefficient for any
key in an aggregation message is limited to be either 0 or 1
in PASKIS. This is because: (1) if a node possesses a key,
it will enforce the coefficient of that key in its own interme-
diate aggregate to be no larger than value one, as stated by
the protocol; (2) if a node does not possess a key, at most
only one of its children is able to use the key to compute
the keyed value that is controlled by the bitmap along with
the aggregation request. Therefore, the size of each aggre-
gation message is bounded by the constant P , leading to the
communication overhead O(1) of the PASKIS protocol.
6 Analysis and evaluation
In this section, we present an analysis and simulation-based
evaluation of our two protocols. Recall that we evaluate
a privacy-preserving data aggregation protocol in terms of
three criteria: effectiveness of privacy preservation, i.e., how
privacy of each node is protected, (2) efficiency, i.e., how
additional overhead is introduced by our protocol compare
to a typical in-network aggregation protocol that does not
consider the privacy preservation, and (3) and data loss re-
silience.
6.1 Effectiveness of privacy-preserving
We evaluate the effectiveness of privacy-preserving of a data
aggregation protocol by examining the probability Pdisclosure
that a node’s private sensed value is disclosed to an ad-
versary who compromises a portion of sensor nodes in the
network and can eavesdrop all network traffic. A lower
Pdisclosure indicates a more effective privacy-preserving pro-
tocol.
In the analysis of our proposal, we assume the worst
case where node-to-node communications are not encrypted
with pair-wise keys [32]. This allows an adversary to eaves-
drop the content of the messages exchanged between the
nodes. However, eavesdropping the communications be-
tween a node s and all of its neighbors is not enough to
disclose the private sensed value of node s. This is because
all communicated aggregates are randomized values. Thus,
an adversary has to obtain the keys that are used by node s
in computing keyed values. To do so, an adversary needs to
compromise a number of nodes (that is not negligible [32])
in the network, or compromise the sink. In the following, we
analyze our protocols in these two attack scenarios.
PASKOS protocol In this protocol, a node uses all the keys
in its key ring to compute its keyed values. Therefore, the
adversary has to obtain a node’s whole key ring in order to
infer this node’s private sensed value.
Assume that the adversary: (i) has compromised C nodes
other than the attack target node and (ii) it has eavesdropped
all network traffic of the target node. Let C1, . . . ,CK denote
a set of events. Each Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ K) represents the following
event: the i-th key of the target node is not known to the
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The probability that i specific keys are not known by the
adversary (not in any of the C nodes) is:









where P is the key pool size, K is the key ring size (same to

















We will show later in simulations that Pdisclosure is ac-
ceptably low when the compromised nodes of the network
are limited to a small portion (which might be true in prac-
tice).
Note that if the adversary is able to compromise the sink,
it can obtain all the pre-distributed keys (the sink holds the
entire key pool). Then, the adversary can infer any node’s
private sensed value.
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Fig. 3 (a) and (b) show the
performance of PASKOS and
PASKIS protocols respectively,
for various key ring sizes
PASKIS protocol A sensor node selects keys from its
key ring that are shared with its ancestors or descendants.
A larger number of actually used keys by a node implies
higher difficulty for an adversary to learn the privacy of this
node. Thus, the worst-case privacy-disclosure scenario oc-
curs in the node with the last number of ancestors and de-
scendants, i.e. the leaf nodes. Suppose that a leaf node has H
ancestors where H is the height of the aggregation tree. Note
that H is dependent on the number of nodes, the density, and
the connectivity of the network). Then, the expected number























The probability of this leaf node’s privacy is discovered






































where C is the number of compromised nodes. Thus, the
worst-case privacy violation is given by Pdisclosure = pH .
In the PASKIS protocol, as the sink does not store any
key, the adversary would not gain any advantage in compro-
mising the sink.
Simulations To further evaluate the privacy-preserving ef-
ficacy of our protocols, we conduct simulations of a wireless
sensor network where there are 200 sensor nodes distributed
uniformly at random in an 1,000 m × 1,000 m area. The
communication range of each sensor node is 150 m. The
key pool size is P = 2,000. In all the simulation plots given
in this section, each data point is the average of 1,000 runs
on different random network topologies.
Our simulation results in Fig. 3(a) show that for the
PASKOS protocol, decreasing the key ring size K can re-
duce the privacy disclosure probability. Intuitively, this is
because the percentage of shared keys in any two key rings is
smaller when the key ring size is smaller. This is consistent
with our analytical result in (2). However, it is interesting to
note that for PASKIS protocol, this trend is only true when
the percentage of compromised nodes is large, as shown in
Fig. 3(b). To understand this, note that a node can only use
keys shared with its ancestors or descendants in the PASKIS
protocol. Thus increasing the key ring size has two effects:
(1) more keys potentially known to the adversary, which im-
plies that Pdisclosure can increase; (2) more keys used by a
node to compute keyed values, which implies that Pdisclosure
can decrease. Figure 3(b) shows that when a large number
of nodes are compromised (higher than about 15%), the first
effect dominates, whereas when less than 15% nodes are
compromised, the second effect dominates. These two ef-
fects can be verified by checking (3) and (4).
Comparing PASKOS vs. PASKIS We mentioned that
PASKIS can provide privacy protection even when an ad-
versary can compromise the sink, but PASKOS cannot pro-
vide privacy under this attack. However, if an adversary
compromises a portion of network nodes but not the sink,
then PASKOS can provide better privacy-preservation than
PASKIS because nodes in PASKOS use all of their pos-
sessed keys for computing keyed values, which means that
the probability for an adversary to obtain all those keys
is smaller with the PASKOS protocol than with PASKIS.
Comparison of the two protocols, based on the simulations
for a network with the same conditions set before (also the
same key pool and key ring size), is shown in Fig. 4. We see
that PASKOS provides much better privacy protection than
PASKIS when there is a large (that is, greater than 10%)
percent of nodes are compromised.
6.2 Communication and computation overhead
Compared with a typical data aggregation protocol such as
TAG [4], our protocols do not introduce additional mes-
sages, but instead append the added privacy-preserving in-
formation to regular aggregation messages. In PASKIS pro-
tocol, each regular message is added with a P-bit bitmap of
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Fig. 4 Privacy-preserving effectiveness comparison between
PASKOS and PASKIS
Fig. 5 Communication overhead comparison between PASKOS and
PASKIS
the pre-distributed keys. Therefore, the size of each mes-
sage is increased by P/8 bytes. In the PASKOS protocol,
in the worst case, the size of a message is increased by
(log2 N + 1)P/8 bytes, which happens when the height of
the aggregation tree is only 1 and all the leaf-nodes choose
the same coefficient for the same key. Note that, P is a
pre-determined constant parameter of the privacy protec-
tion, therefore, the per-node communication complexities
of PASKOS and PASKIS are O(logN) and O(1), respec-
tively. Clearly, in both proposed protocols, each node com-
putes the keyed value using its own pre-assigned keys. The
number of keys assigned to each node is k, which is smaller
than P . Therefore, the per-node computation complexities
of the two protocol are both O(1).
To evaluate the communication overhead, we conduct
simulations in the previous network, and we fix P = 2,000.
Figure 5 shows the additional transferred bytes (per node)
introduced by our protocols, compared with TAG. Consis-
tent with our analysis in Sects. 4.3 and 5.3, we see that
PASKIS’s overhead remains a constant while PASKOS al-
ways has higher communication overhead.
6.3 Data loss resilience
Due to data loss, some readings could be lost. Hence, an ag-
gregation result should be computed from only a portion of
Fig. 6 Percentage of nodes actually participating in data aggregation.
Comparison between TAG and PASKIS
the nodes in the network. Solutions that enjoy this property
are referred to as data loss resilient [6].
Compared with TAG [4], our protocols do not introduce
any additional messages between nodes to guarantee data
loss resilience. However, they increase the size of each mes-
sage. Therefore, if the size-increased message of our pro-
tocols can still be encapsulated in a data packet and the
packet loss rate remains the same, our protocols will have
the same percentage of participating nodes as that of TAG
protocol. In practice, message loss probability can be af-
fected by not only the message size, but also by other com-
plicating factors such as network density, error correction
schemes, traffic amount, etc. In the following, we give a
simple analysis, and leave a comprehensive analysis con-
sidering all those factors as our future work. First, we ob-
serve that all these factors can be summarized or abstracted
as a fundamental deciding factor: per-bit loss/error proba-
bility. Assume that if a message contains an error bit, then
the whole message will be discarded. If we assume a fixed
loss/error probability per bit, then we can compare TAG
and our PASKIS protocol in terms of the actual number of
nodes participating in the data aggregation. In Fig. 6, we
plot the results of a set of simulations on the same network
used in previous simulations. We see that when the bit-wise
loss probability is small, compared with TAG (without any
privacy-protection), the network adopting our protocol (with
effective privacy-protection) has a comparable percentage
of nodes actually participating in the aggregation. Note in
Fig. 6, x-axis is given in loss probability per 200 bytes. This
is just for interpretation convenience, as TAG’s message size
is roughly 200 bytes [1].
Furthermore, our protocols are data-loss resilient. This
is because both PASKOS and PASKIS protocols satisfy the
following properties: (i) intermediate aggregation result will
always be transferred as a whole, i.e., if a message is lost,
corresponding nodes can be regarded as being dropped off
from the aggregation without affecting other nodes; and (ii)
our protocols guarantee that in retrieving the final aggregate
of sensed values, a keyed value is removed only if it exists in
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the received aggregated data. Therefore, the sink will get the
precise aggregation result of those nodes that participated in
the aggregation process.
From Table 1 we can see that many existing solutions are
not data-loss resilient, including SMART [1] and the proto-
col in [6]. Note that the scheme proposed in [33] is not data-
loss resilient unless the list of participating nodes is also re-
ceived by the sink (introducing additional overhead).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we address a relevant issue in WSNs: privacy
in data aggregation. In particular, we propose two protocols,
PASKOS and PASKIS, for efficient privacy-preserving data
aggregation in wireless sensor networks. These two proto-
cols provide an effective protection against both an exter-
nal eavesdropper and internal threats. In particular, PASKOS
can provide a strong privacy-protection for a node against
any other node, or when a portion of network nodes are com-
promised by an adversary. PASKIS achieves privacy pro-
tection even against an adversary that can compromise the
sink—trading off this feature with a slight decrease in the
assured level of privacy.
To the best of our knowledge, both protocols have su-
perior performance than other existing schemes in terms of
privacy preservation and efficiency. Thorough analysis and
simulation results support our findings.
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